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Viewing cable 09STATE101981,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09STATE101981.

Reference ID Released Classification Origin Created 09STATE101981 2009-09-30 21:23 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Secretary of State Appears in these articles:

http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994457.ece

VZCZCXYZ0017 PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1981 2732143
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
PR 302123Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0000 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0000

S E C R E T STATE 101981

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2034 TAGS: IR MNUC PARM

REF: A. BERN 000268 B. BERN 000273 C. STATE 064514

Classified By: EUR/PRA: Kathleen Morenski, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

- 11. (U) Information only, no action.
- 12. (S) On 15 September 2009, Erwin Bollinger Head of Export Control Policy and Sanctions (SECO) met with Acting ISN DAS Tony Foley to discuss
- 13. (S) Acting DAS Foley began the meeting by delivering the key points of the script containing IC-cleared non-paper (see paragraph 7). The Sw
- 14. (S) Bollinger indicated that Colenco had been very cooperative and provided thousands of pages to the Swiss Government in response to the r
- 15. (S) Bollinger stated that exports to Iran have decreased in recent years, and Switzerland is 4th on the list of countries denying exports t
- 16. (S) Bollinger welcomed our cooperation on this matter and said that the GOS would keep us informed of any further developments, including a
- 17. (S//REL SWITZERLAND) BEGIN U.S. NONPAPER (which Embassy Bern is welcome to convey to other Swiss officials if necessary during the course of We applaud Switzerlands decision to suspend Colencos support for Irans nuclear program and welcome the opportunity to provide you with addition Specifically, Switzerland has requested the following information:

Details regarding whether Colenco assistance exceeded that which could be credibly considered "public domain";

The nature and role of Iranian firms MASNA, Ofogh, and ESNICO; and

"Proof" of diversion from Colencos assistance to the Arak heavy water research reactor.

Public Domain

During our technical experts discussion in Budapest in June 2009, Swiss officials noted that Colenco contends its support did not exceed inform The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) definition of "public domain" is "technology that has been made available without restrictions upon its furth We have information that Colenco provided Iran information which would not be permitted under this definition.

Colenco was contracted by Iran to provide custom design and engineering support for the reactor project at Darkhovin.

To do this, Colenco used published reactor design and probabilistic risk assessment methodologies. Those original, published methodologies woul However, the application of those published methodologies by Colenco through its analysis is not. Further, the results were conveyed to Iran as This "value-added" response by Colenco likely constituted the heart of what Iran was intending to purchase when it contracted with Colenco.

As noted previously, Colencos assistance involved primarily design support and at a very detailed level.

At least one of the documents provided by Colenco in this regard was marked "highly confidential data," indicating assistance above the level of This document contained detailed reactor core design specifications derived from output of a Dutch computer code.

Colenco also trained MASNA personnel in Switzerland on probabilistic safety analysis and may have provided technical consultations on specific Discussion of specific design issues with the Darkhovin reactor (the design of which is not public) would go well beyond a credible definition Nature and role of Iranian firms MASNA, Ofogh, and ESNICO

We have information that links each of these firms to Irans nuclear program, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Darkhovin re Management Company for Nuclear Power Plant Construction (MASNA)

MASNA was established in 2006 by the AEOI to manage future nuclear power plant construction. It is an AEOI-owned firm.

AEOI is a UNSCR 1737-designated entity.

The firm was tasked to provide engineering work and support in the areas of fuel, dosimetry, and neutronic calculations on the IR-40 Arak Heavy We have information that, as of fall 2008, MASNA was responsible for conceptual planning, design, and project engineering for the Darkhovin rea Ofogh Consulting Engineers (OCE)

We have information that OCE is a subcontractor to MASNA on the Darkhovin reactor that has conducted site selection, design, and building layou Ofogh was established during a reorganization of AEOIs Nuclear Power Plant Division in 2000 to provide the AEOI with technical and engineering Equipment Supplier for Nuclear Industries Corporation (ESNICO)

We have information that ESNICO is responsible for procurement for the Darkhovin reactor project.

ESNICO has also been previously affiliated with procurement for MITEC, the firm responsible for the construction of the HWRR.

Proof of diversion

The United States does not have proof of diversion from the Darkhovin reactor to the Arak reactor, nor do we believe that such proof is necessary we have already informed you that we have information that Iran has intentionally concealed work related to its Arak reactor by instead associated Further, as we have demonstrated above, the firms responsible for the Darkhovin reactor project are owned or controlled by the AEOI, which has one example of this is the involvement of Seyed Hossein Hosseini, designated in UNSCR 1803 for his involvement at a managerial level in the Arak we have also demonstrated that assistance that could be useful for Darkhovin could be applied in the Arak reactor. Areas in which such diversic AEOIs involvement, as well as the involvement of firms with direct association to both projects, lends credence to our view that it would be in Further, the absence of any clear information demonstrating past diversion should not be considered an indicator that such diversion has not tagging the summary of the projects of any clear information demonstrating past diversion should not be considered an indicator that such diversion has not tagging the projects of the proj

We look forward to continued collaboration on this issue as well as others of mutual, nonproliferation concern.

END U.S. NONPAPER

18. (U) Any substantive questions can be addressed to Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680,) or Judee Allen-Close (ISN/RA, 202-647-8366,). CLINTON